Abstract. Löndahl and Johansson proposed last year a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which replaces Goppa codes by convolutional codes. This modification is supposed to make structural attacks more difficult since the public generator matrix of this scheme contains large parts which are generated completely at random. They proposed two schemes of this kind, one of them consists in taking a Goppa code and extending it by adding a generator matrix of a time varying convolutional code. We show here that this scheme can be successfully attacked by looking for low-weight codewords in the public code of this scheme and using it to unravel the convolutional part. It remains to break the Goppa part of this scheme which can be done in less than a day of computation in the case at hand.
Introduction
In [Sho97] , Peter Shor showed that all cryptosystems based on the hardness of factoring or taking a discrete logarithm can be attacked in polynomial time with a quantum computer (see [BBD09] for an extensive report). This threatens most if not all public-key cryptosystems deployed in practice, such as RSA [RSA78] or DSA [Kra91] . Cryptography based on the difficulty of decoding a linear code, on the other hand, is believed to resist quantum attacks and is therefore considered as a viable replacement for those schemes in future applications. Yet, independently of their so-called "postquantum" nature, code-based cryptosystems offer other benefits even for present-day applications due to their excellent algorithmic efficiency, which is up to several orders of complexity better than traditional schemes.
The first code-based cryptosystem is the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78], originally proposed using Goppa codes. Afterwards several code families have been suggested to replace the Goppa codes in this scheme: generalized Reed-Solomon codes (GRS) [Nie86] [MTSB12] or more recently convolutional codes [LJ12] . Some of these schemes allow to reduce the public key size compared to the original McEliece cryptosystem while keeping the same level of security against generic decoding algorithms.
However, for several of the aforementioned schemes it has been shown that a description of the underlying code suitable for decoding can be obtained-this breaks the corresponding scheme. This has been achieved for generalized Reed-Solomon codes in [SS92] and for subcodes of generalized Reed-Solomon codes in [Wie10] . In this case, the attack takes polynomial time and recovers the complete structure of the underlying generalized Reed-Solomon code from the public key G . The Reed-Muller code scheme has also been attacked, but this time the algorithm recovering the secret description of the permuted Reed-Muller code has sub-exponential complexity [MS07] which is enough for attacking the scheme with the parameters proposed in [Sid94] but which is not sufficient to break the scheme completely. Algebraic geometry codes are broken in polynomial time but only for low genus hyperelliptic curves [FM08] . Finally, it should be mentioned that a first version of the scheme based on LDPC codes proposed in [BC07] has been successfully attacked in [OTD10] (but the new scheme proposed in [BBC08] [BCGO09] ) in order to reduce significantly the key size. However, in this case it was shown that the added structure allows a drastic reduction of the number of unknowns in algebraic attacks and most of the schemes proposed in [BCGO09, MB09] were broken by this approach. This kind of attack has exponential complexity and it can be thwarted by choosing smaller cyclic or dyadic blocks in this approach in order to increase the number of unknowns of the algebraic system. When the rate of the Goppa code is close to 1 (as is the case in signature schemes for instance [CFS01]) then it has been shown in [FGO + ] that the public key can be distinguished from a random public key. This invalidates all existing security proofs of the McEliece cryptosystem when the code rate is close to 1 since they all rely on the hardness of two problems: the hardness of decoding a generic linear code on one hand and the indistinguishability of the Goppa code family on the other hand.
These algebraic attacks motivate the research of alternatives to Goppa codes in the McEliece cryptosystem and it raises the issue of what kind of codes can be chosen in the McEliece cryptosystem. The proposal with convolutional codes made in [LJ12] falls into this thread of research. What makes this new scheme interesting is the fact that its secret generator matrix contains large parts which are generated completely at random and has no algebraic structure as in other schemes such as generalized Reed-Solomon codes, algebraic geometry codes, Goppa codes or Reed-Muller codes.
In [LJ12] two schemes are given. The first one simply considers as the secret key the generator matrix of a time varying tail-biting convolutional code. A scheme for which it is supposed to resist to attacks of time complexity of about 2 80 elementary operations is suggested and has reasonable decoding complexity. This construction presents however the drawback that the complexity of decoding scales exponentially with the security level measured in bits. The authors give a second scheme which is scalable and which is built upon a Goppa code and extends it by adding a generator matrix of a time varying convolutional code.
We study the security of this second scheme in this article. It was advocated that the convolutional structure of the code can not be recovered due to the fact that the dual code has large enough minimum distance. However, we show here that this scheme can be successfully attacked by looking for low-weight codewords in the public code of this scheme. By a suitable filtering procedure of these low weight codewords we can unravel the convolutional part.
The main point which makes this attack feasible is the following phenomenon : the public code of this scheme contains subcodes of much smaller support but whose rate is not much smaller than the rate of the public code. The support of such codes can be easily found by low weight codewords algorithms. It is worthwhile to notice that the code-based KKS signature scheme [KKS97] could be broken with exactly the same approach [OT11] . It turns out that the support of these subcodes reveals the convolutional structure. By suitably puncturing the public code, there is only the Goppa part which remains. Deciphering an encrypted message can then be done because for the concrete parameters example provided in [LJ12] , algorithms for decoding general linear codes can be used in this case to decode the Goppa code successfully. This attack works successfully on the parameters proposed in [LJ12] and needs only a few hours of computation. It should be possible to change the parameters of the scheme to avoid this kind of attack. In order to do so an improved attack is suggested in Subsection 5.1, its complexity is analyzed in Section 5. This suggests that it should be possible to repair the scheme by fixing the parameters in a more conservative way. Some indications about how to perform such a task are given in Subsection 5.3.
The McEliece scheme based on convolutional codes
The scheme can be summarized as follows.
Secret key.
-G sec is a k × n generator matrix which has a block form specified in Figure 1 ; -P is an n × n permutation matrix; -S is a k × k random invertible matrix over
2 is obtained by drawing at random e in F n 2 of weight equal to some quantity t and computing c def = mG pub + e. Decryption. It consists in performing the following steps 1. Calculating c def = cP −1 = mSG sec + eP −1 and using the decoding algorithm of the code with generator matrix G sec to recover mS from the knowledge of c ; 2. Multiplying the result of the decoding by S −1 to recover m.
The point of the whole construction is that if t is well chosen, then with high probability the Goppa code part can be decoded, and this allows a sequential decoder of the time varying convolutional code to decode the remaining errors. From now on we will denote by C pub the code with generator matrix G pub and by C sec the code with generator matrix G sec . 
Description of the Attack
The purpose of this section is to explain the idea underlying our attack which is a message recovery attack taking advantage of a partial key recovery attack. The attack is divided in two main steps. The first step consists in a (partial) key recovery attack aiming at unraveling the convolutional structure. The second part consists in a message recovery attack taking advantage of the fact that if the convolutional part is recovered, then an attacker can decrypt a message with good probability if he is able to decode a linear code of dimension k B and length n B when there are less than t B def = t n B n errors (this is the average number of errors that the Goppa code has to decode).
Unraveling the convolutional structure
The authors have chosen the parameters of the scheme proposed in [LJ12] so that it remains hard to find low-weight codewords in the dual of the public code C pub . It is advocated in [LJ12] that in their case the only deviation from a random code is the convolutional structure in terms of low weight parity-checks. For instance, the following parameters are suggested (n, k) = (1800, 1200) and in the construction phase the authors propose to throw away any code who would have paritychecks of weight less than 125. However, the fact that the structure of C pub leads in a natural way to low weight codewords is not taken into account. Indeed, we expect many (i.e. about 2 b−1 ) codewords of weight less than or equal to c. This comes from the fact that the subcode of C pub generated by the last b rows of G sec (and permuted by P ) has support of size 2c and dimension b. Therefore any algorithm aiming at finding codewords of weight less than c say should output such codewords. Looking at the support of such codewords reveals the 2c last columns of G sec . By puncturing these columns and starting this process again but this time by looking for codewords of weight less than c/2 (since this time the punctured code contains a subcode of dimension b and support of size c arising from the penultimate block of rows of G sec ) will reveal the following block of c columns of the matrix. In other words we expect to capture by these means a first subcode of dimension b and support the 2c last positions of C sec . Then we expect a second subcode of dimension b with support the 3c last positions of C pub and so on and so forth. Finally we expect to be able after suitable column swapping to obtain the generator matrix G of an equivalent code to C pub which would have the form indicated in Figure 2 . More precisely the algorithm for finding a generator matrix of a code equivalent to C pub is given by Algorithm 1 given below.
We assume here that :
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for finding G .
input: G pub the public generator matrix output: a generator matrix G of a code equivalent to C pub which has the form indicated in Fig. 2 .
G is the concatenation of the rows of G0, G1, . . . , GL. return G -the function GeneratorMatrixPuncturedCode takes as input a code C of length n and an ordered set of positions L which is a sublist of [1, 2, . . . , n] and outputs a generator matrix of C punctured in the positions belonging to L; -Function will be a certain function which will be specified later on; -Support(C ) yields the (ordered) support of C and || is the concatenation of lists; -the function LowWeight takes as input a code C and a weight w. It outputs a generator matrix of a subcode of C obtained by looking for codewords of weight less than or equal to w. Basically a certain number of codewords of weight ≤ w are produced and the positions which are involved in at least t codewords are put in a list L (where t is some threshold depending on the weight w, the length n of the code, its dimension k and the number of codewords produced by the previous algorithm), which means that i is taken as soon as there are at least c elements in C for which c i = 1. Then a generator matrix for the subcode of C formed by the codewords of C whose coordinates outside L are all equal to 0 is returned. See Algorithm 2 for further details. -the function ExtendedGeneratorMatrix takes as input a generator matrix of some code C , an ordered set of positions L and a code C such that C is the result of the puncturing of C in the positions belonging to L. It outputs a generator matrix of the permuted subcode C of C whose positions are reordered in such a way that the first positions correspond to the positions of C and the remaining positions to the ordered list L. This code C corresponds to the codewords of C which are extended as codewords of C over the positions belonging to L in an arbitrary linear way.
Finishing the job : decoding the code with generator matrix G B
If we are able to decode the code with generator matrix G B , then standard sequential decoding algorithms for convolutional codes will allow to decode the last (L+1)c positions. Let G B be the generator matrix of a code equivalent to the secret Goppa code chosen for the scheme specified in Figure 
Implementation of the attack for the parameters suggested in [LJ12]
We have carried out the attack on the parameters suggested in [LJ12] . They are provided in Table  1 .
Algorithm 2 LowWeight(G, w)
input:
-G a certain k × n generator matrix of a code C ; -w a certain weight.
output: a generator matrix G of a subcode of C obtained from the supports of a certain subset of codewords of weight w in C . C ← LowWeightCodewordSearch(G, w) {Produces a set of linear combinations of rows of G of weight ≤ w} Initialize an array tab of length n to zero t ← Threshold(w, n, k, |C |)
{Produces a generator matrix for the subcode of C formed by the codewords of C whose coordinates outside L are all equal to 0.} return G . Table 1 . Parameters for the second scheme suggested in [LJ12] . Setting the weight parameter w accurately when calling the function LowWeight is the key for finding the 60 last positions. If w is chosen to be too large, for instance when w = 22, running Dumer's low weight codeword search algorithm [Dum91] gave the result given in Figure 3 concerning the frequencies of the code positions involved in the codewords of weight less than 22 output by the algorithm and stored in table tab during the execution of the algorithm.
We see in Figure 3 that this discriminates the 90 last code positions and not as we want the 60 last code positions. However choosing w to be equal to 18 enables to discriminate the 60 last positions as shown in Figure 4 .
Data used in Figure 4 come from 3900 codewords generated in one hour and a half on an Intel Xeon W3550 (3 GHz) CPU by a monothread implementation in C of Dumer's algorithm. The message recovery part of the attack involving the Goppa code consists in decoding 25.5 errors on average in a linear code of dimension 660 and length 1020. The time complexity is about 2
42 . This second part of the attack could be achieved using the previous program on the same computer in about 6.5 hours on average.
5 Analysis of the security of the scheme
An improved attack
The purpose of this section is to provide a very crude analysis of the security of the scheme. We will not analyze our attack detailed in Section 3, since even if it was enough to break the second scheme suggested in [LJ12] it is not the most efficient one. We will give a sketch of a better attack and a rough analysis for it. Basically, the real threat on this scheme comes from the fact that there exists a subcode C of C pub of very small support (of size 2c here), namely the code generated by the last b rows of G sec permuted by the secret permutation matrix P . For instance, there are about 2 b−1 codewords of weight less than or equal to c which should be found by a low weight codeword searching algorithm and which should reveal the support of C . This is basically the idea underlying our attack. However there are other subcodes of rather small support which yield low weight codewords, namely the codes C s generated by the s×b last rows of G for s ranging between 2 and L. The support of C s is of size (s + 1)c. Notice that its rate gets closer and closer to the rate 2 3 (which is more or less the rate of the final code) as s increases. This is a phenomenon which helps low weight codeword algorithms as will be explained later on.
An improvement of our attack would consist in using a low weight codeword algorithm in order to find one of the codewords of C s and to use this codeword c to bootstrap from here to find the whole support of C s . This is very much in the spirit of the attack against the KKS scheme which is explained in Algorithm 2 which can be found in Subsection 4.4 of [OT11] . With this approach, by using the codeword which has already been found, it is much easier to find new ones belonging to the same subcode with small support by imposing that the information set used for finding low weight codewords is chosen outside the positions belonging to the support of c. The complexity of the whole attack is dominated in this case by the complexity of finding just one codeword in C when there is a good way to identify the candidates in C (which can be done by checking the weight of c). Notice that it is very likely that C is actually the sub code of C of dimension b which has the smallest support. Recall here that this is precisely the notion captured by the generalized Hamming weights of a code [WY93] , w i being defined as the smallest support of a subcode of dimension i. In other words w 1 is nothing but the minimum distance of the code and in our case it is likely that w b = 2c (and more generally w sb = (s + 1)c for s = 1..L). In other words, the problem which should be difficult to solve is the following one Problem 1. Find one of the subcodes of dimension s×b whose support size is the s×b-th generalized Hamming weight of C pub .
We will focus now on the following approach to solve this problem. Consider a low weight codeword algorithm which aims at finding low weight codewords in a code of dimension k by picking up a random set of positions I of size slightly larger than k, say k + l and which looks for all (or at least a non-negligible fraction) of codewords which have weight equal to some small quantity p over these positions. These quantities are very good candidates for having low weight over the whole support. This is precisely the approach which is followed in the best low weight codeword search algorithms such as [Ste88, Dum91, MMT11, BJMM12] . We run such an algorithm for several different sets I and will be interested in the complexity of outputting at least one codeword which belongs to C . This is basically the approach which has been very successful to break the KKS scheme [OT11] and which is the natural candidate to break the [LJ12] scheme.
To analyze such an algorithm we will make some simplifying assumptions
where L = k+l p . We neglect here the cost coming from writing the parity-check matrix in systematic form and this does not really cover the recent improvements in [MMT11, BJMM12] . We have made here such an approximation for sake of simplicity. We refer to [FS09] for an explanation of this cost.
-We assume that the result of the puncturing of C by all positions which do no belong to its support behaves like a random code of dimension k and length n .
Our main result to analyze such an algorithm consists in the following proposition.
Then the complexity that the low weight codeword search algorithm outputs an element in C is of order O C(k, l, p) P .
Proof of Proposition 1
Our first ingredient is a lower bound on the probability that a given set X intersects a random linear code C rand of dimension k and length n picked up uniformly at random. This lemma gives a sharp lower bound even when X is very large and when there is a big gap between the quantities prob(X ∩ C rand = ∅) = prob(∪ x∈X {x ∈ C rand }) and x∈X prob(x ∈ C rand ).
Lemma 1. Let X be some subset of F n 2 of size m and let f be the function defined by f (x)
This lemma can be found in [OT11] and it is proved there. Let us finish now the proof of Proposition 1. Denote by J the support of C :
Let us first calculate the expected number of sets I we have to consider before considering an element of C . Such an event happens precisely when there is a nonzero word in C whose restriction to I ∩ J is of weight equal to p. Let C I∩J be the restriction of the codewords of C to the positions which belong to I ∩ J , that is
Let X be the set of non-zero binary words of support I ∩ J which have weight equal to p. Denote by W the size of I ∩ J . The probability that W is equal to s is precisely
Then the probability P that a certain choice of I gives among the codewords considered by the algorithm a codeword of C can be expressed as
by using Lemma 1 with C and the aforementioned X. Therefore the average number of iterations which have to be performed before finding an element in C is equal to
Repairing the parameters and a pitfall
A possible way to repair the scheme consists in increasing the size of the random part (which corresponds to the last c columns in G sec here). Instead of choosing this part to be of size c as suggested in [LJ12] , its size can be increased in order to thwart the algorithm of Subsection 5.1. Let r be the number of random columns we add at the end of the convolutional part, so that the final length of the code is now n B + Lc + r instead of n B + (L + 1)c as before. If we choose r to be equal to 140, then the aforementioned attack needs about 2 80 operations before outputting an element of C which is the (permuted) subcode corresponding to the last b rows of G sec . As before, let us denote by C s the permuted (by P ) subcode of C pub generated by the last s × b rows of G sec permuted by P . We can use the previous analysis to estimate the complexity of obtaining an element of C s by the previous algorithm. We have gathered the results in Table 2 . We see from this table that in this case the most important threat does not come from finding low weight codewords arising from codewords in C 1 , but codewords of moderate weight arising from codewords in C 20 for instance. Codewords in this code have average weight r+20c 2 = 370. This implies that a simple policy for detecting such candidates which consists in keeping all the candidates in the algorithm of Subsection 5.1 which have weight less than this quantity is very likely to filter out the vast majority of bad candidates and keep with a good chance the elements of C 20 . Such candidates can then be used as explained in Subsection 5.1 to check whether or not they belong to a subcode of large dimension and small support.
There is a simple way for explaining what is going on here. Notice that the rate of C is equal to b c+r , which is much smaller than the rate of the overall scheme which is close to (notice that this phenomenon was already observed in [Ove07] ). This can be explained like this. We choose I to be of size k, the dimension of C pub , and to be an information set for C pub . Then, because the rate of C s is equal to the rate of C pub , we expect that the size of I ∩ J (where J is the support of C s ) has a rather good chance to be of size smaller than or equal to the dimension of C s . This in turn implies that it is possible to get codewords from C s by any choice over the information set I of weight 1 which is non zero over I ∩ J (and therefore of weight 1 there). More generally, even if I ∩ J is slightly bigger than the dimension of C s we expect to be able to get codewords in C s a soon as p is greater than the Gilbert-Varshamov distance of the restriction C s of C s to I ∩ J , because there is in this case a good chance that this punctured code has codewords of weight p. This Gilbert-Varshamov distance will be very small in this case, because the rate of C s is very close to 1 (it is expected to be equal to dim(Cs) |I∩J | ). Nevertheless, it is clear that it should be possible to set up the parameters (in particular increasing r should do the job) so that existing low weight codeword algorithms should be unable to find these subcodes C s with complexity less than some fixed threshold. However, all these codes C s have to be taken into account and the attacks on the dual have also to be reconsidered carefully ( [LJ12] considered only attacks on the dual aiming at finding the codewords of lowest weight, but obviously the same technique used for finding some of the C s will also work for the dual). Moreover, even if by construction the restriction of C = C 1 to its support should behave as a random code, this is not true anymore for C s with s greater than one, due to the convolutional structure. The analysis sketched in Subsection 5.1 should be adapted a little bit for this case and should take into account the improvements over low weight searching algorithms [MMT11, BJMM12] . Finally, setting up the parameters also requires a careful study of the error probability that sequential decoding fails. This whole thread of work is beyond the scope of the present paper.
